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Abstract 
The ’sociology of expectations’ has revealed the importance of expectations in technological 
development processes. Yet little research in this field has focused on Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS). The Swedish state-owned utility Vattenfall became a widely recognized leader in the 
research and development (R&D) of CCS, until it cancelled its CCS R&D in 2014. The aim of this 
paper is to generate a sociological understanding of the ’rise and fall’ of Vattenfall’s CCS project. It 
does so by analyzing the project’s embedded social and political issues in general, and the social 
dynamics of expectations in particular. The analysis focuses on Vattenfall’s ’expectation statements’ 
on CCS in publicly released texts on the CCS project from 2000–2016. It employs an interpretative 
’discourse analysis’ inspired by works within Science and Technology Studies (STS) to analyze the 
embedded scripts in these expectation statements and the narratives that Vattenfall employed in its 
’expectation work’ on CCS. The results show that ’hype-disappointment dynamics’ and ’promise-
requirement dynamics’ played an important role in the ’rise and fall’ of the project. They also show 
how CCS was used as a ’political device’ to legitimize and deflect criticism from Vattenfall’s coal 
and lignite operations. 
Keywords: expectations, hype-disappointment dynamics, promise-requirement dynamics, sociology 
of expectations, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), Vattenfall, Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) 
1. Introduction 
The escalating urgency that surrounds the climate change issue has given rise to a host of novel 
mitigation technologies – and reconfigurations of old technologies in new forms. One of the most 
prominent mitigation technologies is Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS). CCS is based on 
the idea of 1) separating, ’cleaning’ and compressing the waste CO2 that is produced by large point 
sources (>0.1Mt CO2/year), such as fossil fuel power plants and heavy industry plants, 2) 
transporting the CO2 to a permanent storage site (e.g. via pipelines, cargo ships or trains) and 3) 
injecting it into certain geological formations at least 800 meters underground with an impermeable 
layer of cap rock above it  (IPCC, 2005). These storage conditions (theoretically) traps the CO2 1
underground indefinitely. Thus, CCS is not one single technology, but consists of a range of 
technologies. To complicate matters further, the capture-part of the equation itself consists of three 
main technological contenders – pre-combustion, post-combustion and oxyfuel combustion. 
Multiple technological options have also been investigated for the transportation, storage and 
monitoring of the CO2. As Russell et al. (2012: 660) have argued, ”the shape of CCS is not yet 
settled: neither what the system as a whole consists of[…] nor particular components and 
connections between them”. 
The main goal of CCS is thus to capture the majority of the CO2 emissions that are produced 
by fossil fuel-dependent industries and to store them underground indefinitely. The central promise 
of CCS has been said to be that it is ”the only technology that squares the circle of continued 
reliance on fossil fuels with climate change mitigation” (Markusson & Shackley, 2012: 36).  
The research and development (R&D) of CCS generated substantial academic attention from 
scholars from across the social sciences during the 2000’s and the early 2010’s (for overviews, see 
e.g. Meadowcroft & Langhelle, 2009; Markusson et al., 2012), but interest has subsided 
dramatically in recent years. The sudden abandonment of research on CCS left several knowledge 
gaps in its wake. The majority of the social science research on CCS thus far has taken the form of 
studies on the ’public perception’ of CCS, or so-called ’acceptance studies’, where different publics’ 
knowledge of and willingness to accept CCS is gauged (see e.g. Markusson et al., 2012; Russell et 
al., 2012). However, as Russell et al. (2012) argues, ”there are crucial social issues embedded in the 
apparently technical questions they [CCS developers and advocates] are preoccupied with[…] 
 These storage sites include saline aquifers, declining or depleted oil and gas fields and unmineable coal seams. Apart 1
from such ”geo-sequestration” options, there have also been investigations into the ”solid storage” of CO2 through 
chemical reactions with alkaline/alkaline-earth oxides that produces mineral carbonates, as well as offshore deep ocean 
storage (i.e. injecting the CO2 into oceans at depths exceeding 1000 meters). Because of the latter two proposals’ 
potentially detrimental ecological effects and uncertain international legal status (cf. IPCC, 2005: 38ff), they are 
generally no longer considered feasible.
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These issues go way beyond those of public ’perception’ and acceptance that social scientists are 
usually called in to address” (Russell et al., 2012: 666). Works within the fields of Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) and the philosophy and sociology of technology have long drawn 
attention to the embedded social and political issues in technological development processes. For 
instance, Sundqvist argues that ”Technological projects are developed for solving social problems, 
and should be understood as political devices embedded in social interests and sociopolitical 
decision processes for overcoming these problems” (2012: 69). CCS projects should consequently 
also be understood as political devices, since their primary goal is to help solve the social, or ’socio-
environmental’, problem of climate change. However, there has been a lack of STS-inspired 
research on CCS development processes which has focused on these embedded political and social 
issues. This paper aims at providing such an analysis and filling this knowledge gap. More 
specifically, the paper will examine the social dynamics of expectations in CCS development 
processes – an area which has been undertheorized in previous research. It will take the Swedish 
state-owned energy utility Vattenfall’s high-profile CCS project as its case. In-depth analyses of 
Vattenfall’s CCS project have been similarly lacking from previous research (however, for a 
historical overview, see Hansson, 2008). 
Vattenfall became a widely recognized leader in the development of coal/lignite power 
production with CCS from the middle of the 2000’s until the company announced that it had 
cancelled its R&D on CCS on 6 May 2014 (Vattenfall, 2014). The company was especially 
prominent in the R&D of the oxyfuel capture technology, which became somewhat of a ’flagship’ 
technology for the company. Vattenfall’s CCS project was closely interconnected with the 
company’s politically controversial expansion into Germany (see Hansson, 2008; Högselius, 2009). 
This paper will therefore focus on Vattenfall’s CCS-related activities in Germany. Vattenfall 
acquired significant coal and lignite assets in Germany between 1999 and 2002 (Hansson, 2008; 
Högselius, 2009). Prior to the expansion into Germany, Vattenfall’s ’energy mix’ had largely 
consisted of ’clean’ hydropower and nuclear power assets in Sweden. Thus, Vattenfall’s acquisitions 
of German lignite mines and power plants were, and have remained, controversial. Critics argued 
that it was inappropriate for a Swedish state-owned energy utility to go into the environmentally 
harmful business of lignite mining and power generation in Germany, and that this decision was 
irreconcilable with Sweden’s energy and climate policies and the companies state-mandated 
sustainability goals (see e.g. Hansson, 2008: 263ff). It was in this politically precarious context that 
CCS emerged as a possible solution to Vattenfall’s lignite conundrum. 
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2. Purpose and research questions 
This paper aims at generating an understanding of the social dynamics that contributed to the ’rise 
and fall’ of Vattenfall’s CCS project and the projects’s embedded social and political issues. In order 
to do so, it will employ theories and concepts from the sociology of expectations literature, which 
focuses on the importance of expectations, visions and promises in technological development 
processes. These concepts are all related and overlap to a certain extent. Technological expectations 
have influentially been defined as ”real-time representations of future technological situations and 
capabilities” (Borup et al., 2006: 286). Technological visions and promises similarly represent 
future technological situations and capabilities in ’real-time’, but ”emphasize to a higher degree 
their enacting and subjectively normative character. They stress that expectations are wishful 
enactments of a desired future” (Borup et al., 2006: 286). The latter point is crucial, since it is this 
wishful enactment of a desired future that lends expectations, visions and promises their 
performative character, as we will return to below. More specifically, the paper will employ the 
notions of ’hype-disappointment dynamics’ and ’promise-requirement dynamics’ in order to analyze 
the social dynamics of expectations in Vattenfall’s CCS project. 
The paper will investigate Vattenfall’s production of expectations and visions on the CCS 
technology, and its simultaneous production of expectations and visions on the society which would 
’receive’ the technology. In other words, it will investigate Vattenfall’s production of the CCS 
technology alongside its production of political visions – or Vattenfall’s ’mutual shaping’ of 
technology and society. In doing so, the paper hopes to shed light on the embedded social and 
political issues in Vattenfall’s CCS project. 
The purpose of the paper is to fill two knowledge gaps. Firstly, it aims at showing how 
Vattenfall’s CCS project can be understood as a political device ”embedded in social interests and 
sociopolitical decision processes” (Sundqvist, 2012: 69). As mentioned above, STS-approaches to 
CCS development processes have been missing from much of the previous research. Secondly, the 
paper aims at showing how the social dynamics of the expectations that Vattenfall generated in its 
CCS project contributed to the ’rise and fall’ of the project. There have been no in-depth analyses 
on Vattenfall’s CCS project. Not only is the case interesting from a STS perspective, it is also of 
utmost societal relevance because of Vattenfall’s state-owned nature.  
The paper will critically examine the following research questions:  
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1) What expectations and visions of CCS and the society which would ’receive’ the technology 
did Vattenfall generate in its CCS project? 
2) How did the social and technical expectations that Vattenfall generated in its CCS project 
contribute to the ’rise and fall’ of the project? 
3) In what way(s) can Vattenfall’s CCS project be understood as a ’political device’? 
3. Theoretical perspectives: the sociology of expectations 
The sociology of expectations developed from van Lente’s (1993) introduction of the concept of 
expectations as a key driver of technological change (van Lente & Bakker, 2010). The literature 
largely focuses on the importance of collective expectations – i.e. widely shared and publicly 
communicated expectations – in technological development and innovation processes. These 
collective expectations are important since ”they stimulate, steer and coordinate action of 
actors” (van Lente & Bakker, 2010: 694) under the inherent conditions of uncertainty in 
technological development processes (Budde & Konrad, 2013). Actors that are engaged in 
technology development have to rely on imaginings, expectations and visions about the future (of 
the technology), rather than on robust knowledge of the ’actual’ future when deciding about e.g. 
what strategies to adopt (e.g. Budde & Konrad, 2013). Borup et al. therefore argues that ”Novel 
technologies and fundamental changes in scientific principle do not substantively pre-exist 
themselves, except and only in terms of the imaginings, expectations and visions that have shaped 
their potential” (2006: 285).  
Technological expectations have influentially been defined as ”real-time representations of 
future technological situations and capabilities” (Borup et al., 2006: 286). However, since ’non-
technological’ expectations, e.g. ”expectations concerning the future socio-economic environment 
or the institutional framework conditions can have a major influence on the technological 
innovation itself” (Budde & Konrad, 2013: 4), this paper will employ a wider definition of 
expectations. For the purposes of this paper, expectations will therefore be defined as ”real time 
representations of future situations” (Budde & Konrad, 2013: 4). 
The sociology of expectations has been characterized as the study of ”how the future is 
mobilised in real time to marshal resources, coordinate activities and manage uncertainty” (Brown 
& Michael, 2003: 2). This mobilization of the future into the present through the medium of 
expectations and visions also entail powerful political and moral dimensions, since other possible 
futures are discounted or excluded in this process. Berkhout comments in relation to this that:  
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[…] to give them force, visions of the future tend to be ‘moralised’, in the sense of being encoded and decoded 
as either utopias or dystopias. This is because the possible effects of different visions are socially distributed 
(there will be winners and losers), and because one way of enrolling actors to a particular vision is to attach it to 
positive moral values, or to visualise the negative consequences of not pursuing it (Berkhout, 2006: 300) 
Budde and Konrad also argue that power relationships play an important role in the shaping of 
expectations and visions of the future, since ”actors try to ’colonize the future’ by articulating 
expectations corresponding to a future desirable from their perspective” (2013: 6). In the context of 
expectations as resources for actors (see van Lente, 1993) which shapes and are shaped by power 
relations, it has also been emphasized that ”Different groups construct the same expectation 
differently amongst themselves and to others. Scientists, for example, may acknowledge caveats 
behind closed doors but downplay them in front of investors” (Porter & Randalls, 2014: 2; see also 
Brown & Michael, 2003). Budde and Konrad also write that several studies have shown that ”actors 
may consciously stimulate or even inflate expectations about a technology they have stakes 
in” (2013: 6). 
So far in our discussion, expectations may come across simply as rhetorical resources that can 
be employed by actors in the (discursive) struggle to shape the future. However, the literature 
emphasizes that expectations should be seen as actants in their own right. Elaborating on this point, 
van Lente points out that ”the [expectation] statement itself alters social reality: it creates, 
reinforces, or destroys a social connection, or linkage. It is a ’speech act’” (1993: 190). Expectations 
are therefore viewed as performative – i.e. as doing something, as demanding action (van Lente, 
1993), as acting upon the world (Porter & Randalls, 2014) – rather than simply as (passive, 
descriptive) ”representations of something that does not (yet) exist” (van Lente, 1993: 190). Borup 
et al. further this argument by stating that ”expectations are ‘constitutive’ or ‘performative’ […] in 
attracting the interest of necessary allies […] and in defining roles and in building mutually binding 
obligations and agendas” (2006: 289). Expectations can therefore be said to contain a script 
(Akrich, 1992), i.e. ”explicit or implicit messages and guidelines ’built in’ in artefacts” (van Lente, 
1993: 191), or ”a description of  the  future  situation and a  concomitant  distribution of  roles  for 
selves, others and technologies” (van Lente & Bakker, 2010: 694). Porter and Randalls argue that 
”expectations have material and discursive effects. They act on the world. Inscribed in texts, bodies, 
machines and actions they help steer present futures or take on a life of their own” (2014: 2). In 
other words, expectations contribute to the shaping of the future – not just ideologically or 
discursively, but also in material senses – through their performativity and the scripts they contain.  
However, critics have argued that collective expectations do not necessarily or automatically 
produce the envisioned future. Berkhout (2006), for instance, argues that expectations or visions 
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about the future should be seen as ’bids’ about what the future might be like, which coexist with a 
multitude of other expectation bids. Whether a bid will be successful in realizing some version of its 
envisaged future depends on its ability to enroll ’adherents and advocates’ to actualize the bid 
(Berkhout, 2006). Furthermore, Berkhout (2006) argues that in the rare cases where expectations 
actually succeed in materializing at all, they often do so in a radically modified version of the 
original vision. Similarly, Pollock and Williams argue that ”we cannot presume stable trajectories 
and the continuation of existing sets of expectations” (2010: 529) during the development of novel 
technologies. Later entries into the literature have therefore often emphasized that collective 
expectations ”act as provisional, and in that sense tentative, but forceful assumptions on the future 
potential and requirements of an emerging technology” (Budde & Konrad, 2013: 2, my emphases) 
which requires a network of actors to continuously perform the vision in order for it to have a 
chance of materializing (see e.g. van Lente, 2012). 
For these reasons, it is often emphasized that expectations and visions of the future are usually 
contested, and that expectations are dynamic – i.e. they evolve and change over time. To analyze the 
social dynamics of expectations, this paper will employ two more specific notions from the 
sociology of expectations literature – promise-requirement dynamics and hype-disappointment 
dynamics. 
3.1. Promise-requirement dynamics 
The concept ’promise-requirement dynamics’ describes the phenomenon whereby promising ideas, 
innovations or innovation fields turn into requirements through performative expectation statements 
(’speech acts’). These expectation statements create linkages in actor-networks (e.g. in the form of 
binding obligations and scripted roles), and gain ’forcefulness’ by being taken up in agendas. 
Promises can in these cases be said to be translated into requirements (van Lente, 1993). An 
example of this might be if a CEO of a technology company publicly announces that a technology 
that the company is working on is expected to be operational and ready for market introduction by 
2020. This expectation statement (or promise) would then be translated into a requirement for the 
company’s technologists to deliver on the CEO’s promise (given that the promise related to issues 
that were already on the company’s agenda).  
Furthermore, van Lente and Rip state that ”Technological promises function as a yardstick for 
the present and as a signpost for the future. The implication for the dynamics of concrete 
developments is that what starts as an ’option’ can be labeled a technical ’promise,’ and may 
subsequently function as a ’requirement’ to be achieved, and a ’necessity’ for technologists to work 
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on, and for others to support” (1998: 216). They underline that these dynamics are part of a social 
process that is not autonomous, deterministic or irreversible – but something which is actively 
constructed and performed by the involved actors (van Lente & Rip, 1998: 216). 
3.2. Hype-disappointment dynamics 
The notion of ’hype-disappointment cycles’ or ’dynamics’ relates to the process whereby ”Initial 
enthusiasm produces hype, elevating expectations, before relapsing when that hype is revealed to be 
unjustified, with hope consequently recycled into new expectations or old expectations rebuilt in 
new ways” (Porter and Randalls , 2014: 2). It has been suggested by several papers that high initial 
expectations are necessary in order to attract the attention and interest that is required to enroll 
actors and mobilize resources for an innovation project (e.g. Borup et al., 2006; Brown & Michael, 
2003; Geels & Smit, 2000). Furthermore, it has been shown that technologists and scientists may 
strategically use exaggerated expectations – in the sense that they may downplay the many 
contingencies, uncertainties and risks that may hinder the realization of the project – as a strategic 
resource in order to attract allies and funding for their projects (Brown & Michael, 2003; Geels & 
Smit, 2000). As Borup et al. puts it, ”Early technological expectations are in many cases 
technologically deterministic, downplaying the many organizational and cultural factors on which a 
technology’s future may depend” (2006: 290). Disappointments are therefore seen as likely in the 
evolving social dynamics of expectations. 
4. Previous research 
Previous ’expectation studies’ have shown that expectations play an important role in establishing 
and governing new scientific and technological fields in areas as diverse as membrane technology 
(van Lente & Rip, 1998), neural computing (Guice, 1999), gene therapy (Martin, 2001), 
pharmacogenomics (Hedgecoe & Martin, 2003) and nanotechnology (Selin, 2006). Similarly, 
research focusing on hype-disappointment dynamics (e.g. Brown and Michael, 2003; Geels & Smit, 
2000) and promise-requirement dynamics (e.g. van Lente, 1993; van Lente & Rip, 1998) has shown 
that these dynamics play an important role in the development and evolution of scientific and 
technological fields and projects. These studies have all drawn attention to the critical role that 
collective expectations play in legitimizing emerging technologies, in mobilizing funds and 
attention from other actors and in reducing the inherent uncertainty that decision-makers face in 
technological development processes. Furthermore, they highlight the critical role of expectations 
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and visions in garnering support for vulnerable nascent technologies – especially in the initial phase 
when e.g. proof of concept, prototypes and hard results do not (yet) exist (Selin, 2008). This is often 
done through the production of ’promising stories’ about the emerging technology (Selin, 2008). 
These stories will be a focal point for the analysis in this paper, as we will return to below. 
’Expectation studies’ on CCS have thus far been sparse, with a few exceptions. Hansson 
(2012), for instance, shows how the production of techno-economic models and scientific scenarios 
on CCS is influenced by expectations and, in turn, influences expectations. The article shows how 
methodological issues in the scenario literature has led to problematic results regarding the future of 
CCS – especially concerning its estimated cost (Hansson, 2012: 78ff). Hansson (2012) argues that 
these issues have resulted in inflated expectations regarding the feasibility of CCS as a mitigation 
technology. The article shows how the scenario literature’s issues, in turn, have influenced the 
energy industry’s high expectations on CCS and the high expectations on CCS that are presented in 
policy documents (Hansson, 2012). 
Hansson argues that because CCS is commonly seen as the only technology which could 
potentially ’square the circle’ of continued fossil fuel exploitation with mitigation, ”…CCS is 
constructed as essential and the methodological restrictions and simplifications are justified [in the 
scenarios and models]. Managing the remaining real problems with CCS, which are almost entirely 
framed as non-technical, is consequently described as a collective societal responsibility” (Hansson, 
2012: 87). This, Hansson (2012) argues, is the reason why politicians and publics must be supplied 
with scientifically produced knowledge on CCS according to the scenario literature. But, as 
Hansson (2012) shows, this knowledge has vital flaws. While the article provides valuable 
knowledge that will be employed in the analysis of Vattenfall’s CCS project, its research object 
differs from this paper’s. 
Russell et al. (2012) outlines a social science research agenda on CCS demonstration 
activities by showing how concepts and theories generated within STS and the sociology of 
expectations can be fruitfully applied to CCS demonstration activities. For instance, they discuss the 
ways in which demonstrations can be interpreted as theatre – as a performance which creates ”a 
story of the technology in use, often tightly scripted to achieve the desired naturalistic 
depiction” (Russell et al., 2012: 656). They also discuss the ways in which demonstration events 
play into the negotiation and (potential) closure of the meaning of the technology, or ”the political 
and discursive contest between competing interpretations of the available technological options, so 
that a particular envelope becomes taken for granted as the essence of the technology” (Russell et 
al., 2012: 657). 
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With regard to the sociology of expectations, Russell et al. argues that ”To date, CCS consists 
to a large extent of visions: there is a relevant knowledge base, there is experience of component 
technologies as used in other applications […] but there is little experience of anything like a 
complete CCS system” (2012: 660). The production and enactment of collective expectations and 
visions is therefore seen as vital in order for the technology to be able to materialize. Russell et al. 
(2012) argues that demonstrations play a central role in the generation of visions on CCS – 
particularly visions of full-scale, commercial versions of the technology. Furthermore, CCS 
demonstrations play an important role ”in filling out and confronting visions with reality, as well as 
in promoting and developing the visions” (Russell et al., 2012: 660). Similar to what previous 
research in the sociology of expectations has shown, they argue that (overly high) expectations 
introduces new problems for the developers and advocates of CCS, since CCS demonstrations may 
backfire and ’punch holes’ in the visions (Russell et al., 2012: 660).  
Russell and colleagues’ article, like Hansson’s, provides valuable knowledge which will be 
used in this paper’s analysis. However, the article covers a (partially) different research object than 
the one this paper is interested in exploring. 
5. Design and method 
In order to analyze Vattenfall’s ’mutual shaping’ of technology and society, the paper will adopt an 
interpretative and constructivist approach, inspired by previous works in the STS field generally 
(see e.g. Law, 2015) and the ’sociology of expectations’ more specifically. STS has close ties to 
’grounded theory’, in that it has a strong focus on empiricism (see e.g. Clarke & Leigh Star, 2008). 
The analysis in this paper will also have a strong empirical focus, and, much like grounded theory, I 
have employed an abductive approach (see Clarke & Leigh Star, 2008: 117). 
The paper will use a qualitative case study design with Vattenfall’s CCS project acting as the 
case. The contextual conditions are in this case very relevant to the phenomenon that is being 
studied – i.e. Vattenfall’s production and communication of collective expectations and visions on 
CCS – and the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are entangled and unclear, 
which makes a case study design suitable for the study (see Yin, 2008).  
The case study will take the form of a discourse analysis – discourse here understood as 
”assemblages of language, motive, and meaning, moving toward mutually understood modus 
vivendi–ways of (inter)acting” (Clarke & Leigh Star, 2008: 116). As Clarke and Leigh Star point 
out, this definition of discourse ”include commitments that stem from work and material 
contingencies” (2008: 116). In other words, it highlights the heterogenous ways in which discourses 
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are embedded in, and stem from collective, material action (see Clarke & Leigh Star, 2008). STS-
approaches are particularly well known for paying attention to both material and symbolic practices 
and the ways in which they mutually shape one another (see e.g. Law, 2015), which is why this 
version of a discourse analysis was chosen for the study. 
The paper has followed the methodological pointers laid out by van Lente (1993), who argues 
that the analyst should focus on gathering and analyzing ’expectation statements’, i.e. statements 
that contain (collectively held) expectations which are uttered in public or written down. Since 
”statements, by their nature, are made explicitly”, they are therefore ”public and […] accessible, for 
actors and analysts” (van Lente, 1993: 33). Furthermore, expectation statements ”refer to shared 
orientations, or are shared themselves” (van Lente, 1993: 33). Shared or collective expectations are 
the type of expectations that are of interest here, since private expectations ”can only become 
effective as far as they are linked to shared expectations” (van Lente, 1993: 33). 
Expectations commonly take the form of ’stories’, or ’narratives’ (cf. Selin, 2008). As Law 
notes, narratives, and the tropes (figures of speech and metaphors) on which they draw, carry 
political and social agendas (2015: 6). Special attention was therefore payed to the stories/narratives 
that Vattenfall produced and employed in its ’expectation work’ on CCS.  
The analysis was carried out in three steps. First, expectation statements and stories/narratives 
were identified through an inductive reading of the material. Second, these expectation statements 
and stories/narratives were analyzed with the help of the theoretical framework laid out in part 3. 
Lastly, Vattenfall’s collective expectations on the CCS project were analyzed to see if transitions 
and transformations of particular note could be identified. This resulted in a chronological, 
descriptive – or ’de-scriptive’ (Akrich, 1992) – ’re-telling’ of Vattenfall’s original narrative 
constructions, or ’plot’ (cf. van Lente, 1993: 179), on CCS, which will be presented in part 7. 
5.1. Material 
The material for this paper consists of publicly released texts in which Vattenfall disseminates and 
projects its expectations and visions on CCS into the ’public sphere’. These texts include 
Vattenfall’s various reports, its R&D Magazine and its press releases on CCS. To complement these 
texts, I have also gathered and analyzed scientific reports and articles that were produced within 
Vattenfall’s CCS project. This was done in order to access more in-depth technological expectations 
on CCS. Finally, I have also analyzed more overtly political documents, such as the report Curbing 
Climate Change (2006), in which Vattenfall presents its vision for a global ’adaptive burden-sharing 
model’ and a global CO2 emissions trading system.  
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The material that I have analyzed was produced between 1997 and 2016. However, CCS is 
barely mentioned in the material before 2000. Because of this, I decided to start the analysis with 
the year 2000. I also decided to limit the materials to texts that were produced by Vattenfall and the 
actors that it enrolled into its CCS project. I would have liked to include texts that were produced in 
the CCS networks in which Vattenfall participated (e.g. the EU Framework Programmes that 
Vattenfall participated in). I would also have liked to interview engineers and/or scientists who 
worked on the project to access more ’informal expectations’ on the project (see van Lente, 1993). 
But including this material would have been unmanageable for the scope of this paper. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the material led to a situation in which I felt that I had reached a point 
of ’data saturation’, or ’theoretical sufficiency’ (see e.g. Marshall & Rossman, 2011: 220). 
6. Ethics 
Because the paper’s material consists of publicly released documents, there are no clear ethical 
issues (cf. Marshall & Rossman, 2011: 162). The ’criterion of the protection of the individual’ (see 
e.g. Swedish Research Council, 2011) isn’t easily applicable since the study does not have any 
informants. Furthermore, the paper does not deal with individual persons, but with Vattenfall as an 
institution. The paper therefore does not contain any names of individual employees, for example. 
However, the paper will unavoidably reference the names of the authors of the scientific papers that 
have been analyzed. But since these papers have all been published in books or journals, using the 
authors’ names should be unproblematic from an ethical standpoint. The most problematic texts 
from an ethical point is a PowerPoint on CCS (Strömberg, 2003) and a paper from a symposium on 
CCS (Strömberg, 2001), for which I have not acquired express permission from the author. 
However, both of these texts are also publicly available through the National Energy Technology 
Laboratory (NETL) and Chalmers University of Technology, respectively. 
In this case, the ’research criterion’ (see e.g. Swedish Research Council, 2011) in my view 
outweighs the ethical concerns that might be raised. The research criterion mandates critical inquiry 
into the business of powerful actors such as Vattenfall. This is especially true since Vattenfall is a 
state-owned company, which is ultimately owned by the Swedish people. 
7. Results 
In this part, the results of the study will be presented. As mentioned above, Vattenfall’s CCS project 
was closely interconnected with the company’s expansion into the German coal and lignite markets, 
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wherefore the analysis will focus on Vattenfall’s CCS-related activities in Germany. The reading of 
the material revealed three broad periods, or ’phases’ in Vattenfall’s CCS project. The phases should 
not, however, be seen as anything other than heuristics to help develop an understanding of 
Vattenfall’s CCS activities. The analysis will be structured according to these three phases, which 
will be presented below. 
7.1. Phase 1: 2000-2002. CCS is identified as a promising opportunity. 
The first CCS ’project group’ was formed at Vattenfall Research & Development in 2000, at which 
time Vattenfall had begun its expansion into Germany. In one of the few mentions of CCS in the 
material from 2000, Vattenfall states that ”In the long term, [CCS] has considerable potential. From 
this perspective, coal could be considered to be a sustainable fuel. Vattenfall intends to follow and 
actively participate in developments to separate and store carbon dioxide on a commercial basis in 
order to minimize the impact of fossil fuels on the climate” (Annual Report, 2000: 22, my 
emphasis). Already at this early stage, it is (tentatively) expected that coal could become a 
’sustainable fuel’ through the development and deployment of CCS. 
In 2001, Vattenfall began conducting R&D on CCS for coal-fired power plants in 
collaboration with ”universities, industrial colleagues and other professional organizations, such as 
Linde AG and others” (Strömberg, 2001: 60). The project was given the working name the ’CO2 
demo project’ (Strömberg, 2001). The ultimate goal of the project was to ”build a 250 MW lignite-
fired plant with zero emissions on German ground in [the] future” (Strömberg, 2001: 60). The 
research that was conducted by Vattenfall and its partners focused on assessing the different capture 
options (post-combustion, pre-combustion, chemical looping combustion and oxyfuel combustion) 
with regard to their potential, costs and consequences compared to other emission reduction options 
(Strömberg, 2001: 60). These ’other options’ were identified as a) improving fossil fuel plant 
efficiency by replacing old plants with new ones, b) changing fuels from coal to natural gas and c) 
R(D)&D of ”truly sustainable energy sources”, i.e. wind, solar, biofuels and hydropower 
(Strömberg, 2001: 58–59). It was stated that in the ”short term these [other] options are the only 
ones available” (Strömberg, 2001: 59), but in the ”slightly longer term”, CCS is ”very 
promising” (Ibid.). The perceived advantaged of CCS, compared to the other mitigation options, 
was that it could create a ”possibility of using coal as a fuel and still showing concern for the 
environment” and that it could ”create an option for using an energy source which is found all over 
the world, is relatively cheap, does not have the obvious security problem of oil and gas and […] is 
so plentiful that it will last for several hundred years” (Strömberg, 2001: 63). Furthermore, it was 
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stated that ”The potential is great, and there is considerable industrial experience. The present cost 
is high, estimated at 50 €/ton of CO2 a few years ago, but this is still lower than for most 
renewables. Research and development of CO2 capture and storage might bring down costs 
considerably. At present the total cost is estimated at 30–35 €/ton of CO2” (Strömberg, 2001: 59). 
By now, Vattenfall had clearly identified CCS as a promising opportunity for the company, and 
expectations on the technology were already high. These high expectations likely helped enroll the 
aforementioned academic and industrial actors into its CCS project. 
The above paragraph highlights three expectations: 1) that the estimated total cost (i.e. 
capture, transport and storage) would be around 30–35 €/ton, 2) that CCS would allow for coal 
power to become ’environmentally friendly’, and 3) that there is ’considerable industrial 
experience’, which implies that the development of the technology was seen as more surmountable 
than the development of wholly ’new’ technologies (cf. Strömberg, 2001). Previous research has 
highlighted that the latter is a recurring argument and expectation amongst CCS advocates, even 
though most industry experience stem from the use of ’component technologies’ in other industrial 
applications – not of anything like a full ’CCS chain’ (see Hansson, 2012; Russell et al., 2012). The 
’stabilization’ of what components to use in the ’CCS chain’ and problems relating to their 
’integration’ into a ’unified technology’ (cf. Russell et al., 2012) would be one of Vattenfall’s 
primary issues. 
Expectations were especially high for the oxyfuel technology. The cost of capturing and 
transforming the CO2 to liquid form was expected to be 10-13 €/ton of CO2 for an oxyfuel power 
plant on the scale of Vattenfall’s Lippendorf (865 MW) power plant (Strömberg, 2001: 63). 
Furthermore, it was expected that a plant on this scale could be made into a true ’zero emission 
plant’ with ”virtually no CO2 emissions, no sulphur emissions, and considerably reduced NOx 
emissions”, and that the investment cost could be less than for a conventional power plant 
(Strömberg, 2001: 63). The oxyfuel process therefore seemed to be the most favorable and cost-
effective of the CO2 capture technologies, in Vattenfall’s view (Strömberg, 2001: 63). The high 
expectations regarding the potential of the oxyfuel technology led to a continued focus on this 
particular capture option. 
Vattenfall began conducting laboratory experiments on the oxyfuel capture process together 
with researchers at Chalmers University of Technology in 2002 (Vattenfall, 2016a). Vattenfall also 
conducted a feasibility study on a commercial-scale 865 MW oxyfuel power plant. The results 
indicated that ”O2/CO2 [oxyfuel] combustion is a realistic and a near future option for CO2 
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reductions in the power sector with an avoidance cost of approximately $8 per tonne CO2 excluding 
transportation and injection costs” (Andersson et al. 2003: 1056). 
However, Vattenfall emphasized that CCS was not a replacement for other mitigation 
technologies. Instead, it was viewed as a technology which might ”buy some time for the 
development of as yet unknown [sustainable] energy sources, which are necessary” (Strömberg, 
2001: 59). It was, however, seen as a promising means of achieving the drastic emissions reductions 
that the company, Europe and the world would need in order to mitigate climate change (Strömberg, 
2001; Annual Report, 2001). In sociology of expectations terms, the identification of CCS as a 
promising opportunity and the launch of the CCS R&D project made sure that CCS was taken up in 
a local agenda – in this case, finding a cost-effective means of reducing the environmental impact of 
the company’s new coal and lignite power generation assets (cf. Strömberg, 2001; Annual Report 
2001; 2002). 
7.2. Phase 2: 2003–2009. CCS is hyped and promises are translated into 
requirements. 
In 2003, Vattenfall introduced its CCS R&D project more officially to the general public (CSR 
Report, 2003). The project had now been rebranded ’the CO2 free power plant’. Vattenfall stated 
that the project aimed at ”developing a coal combustion power plant with in principle no CO2 
emissions” and that ”the project will end with the construction and testing of a 250 MW electricity 
demonstration plant in 2010, with the aim of developing a commercial concept during the later half 
of the next decade [the 2010’s]” (CSR Report, 2003: 15). This performative expectation statement – 
that the project will end with the construction of a demonstration plant – functioned as a means of 
translating the ’promise’ of CCS into a concrete ’requirement’ for the engineers and technologist 
that Vattenfall had enrolled into its CCS project to work on (cf. van Lente & Rip, 1998). 
Vattenfall continued focusing its CCS efforts on the oxyfuel process. The main opportunities 
with oxyfuel, in Vattenfall’s view, were that the technology is based on existing boiler and steam 
cycle technology – which, according to Vattenfall, could take advantage of ongoing (as of 2003) 
R&D projects on how to increase the efficiency of conventional power plants, such as the AD700 
project (Strömberg, 2003: 22). Furthermore, the technology was expected to allow for the ’co-
capture’ of CO2 and other pollutants, which would effectively result in a ’near zero emission power 
plant’ and reduce the cost of flue gas treatment (Strömberg, 2003: 22). The oxyfuel process was also 
expected to benefit from ’next generation’ boiler designs, such as compact Pulverized Fuel boilers 
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and Circulating Fluidized Bed boilers (Strömberg, 2003: 22). All things considered, this meant that 
the oxyfuel technology was expected to be significantly cheaper with regard to both the total and 
the variable Cost of Electricity (COE) compared to both post-combustion and pre-combustion 
technologies (Strömberg, 2003). These statements highlight the fact that Vattenfall’s expectations 
were contingent upon the success of developments that lay partly outside of its own immediate CCS 
project, such as the AD700 project. These contingencies were downplayed in Vattenfall’s 
’expectation work’, however. 
A number of ’challenges’ with the oxyfuel process were also outlined. Vattenfall identified 
potential problems with the possibility and cost of a scale-up of the component technologies that 
would be necessary in order for the oxyfuel process to work and potential problems with the 
integration of these technologies into the overall oxyfuel ’CCS chain’ (see Strömberg, 2003). These 
issues again underline the contingencies in Vattenfall’s CCS project.  
Vattenfall also identified more specific issues, e.g. regarding the design of the CO2 
compression train. The exact specifications of the compression train was seen as dependent on what 
CO2 impurity level that was acceptable (Andersson et al., 2003; Strömberg, 2003). This, 
furthermore, depended on the intended end use of the CO2 – e.g. geological storage, Enhanced Oil 
Recovery (EOR) or other industrial purposes (Strömberg, 2003). In this context, it was stated that 
”Requirements on CO2 purity from transport, storage [and] environmental perspective is generally 
unexplored” and that the ”Behaviour of CO2 with impurities at high pressures (supercritical) is not 
well known (solubility etc.)” (Strömberg, 2003: 25). These statements shine a light on the project’s 
close interconnections with political, legal and scientific issues. Legal frameworks that regulated the 
acceptable impurity level for safe geological storage, for example, would have to be developed 
simultaneously as the technical development of CCS progressed. This, furthermore, called for a 
(scientific) knowledge production on the behaviour of CO2 with impurities under supercritical 
conditions. The complex interconnections between these social, political, scientific and technical 
issues highlights why CCS projects such as Vattenfall’s should be interpreted as emerging 
’sociotechnical systems’ which exhibit varying degrees of (technical and organizational) 
’integration’ (cf. Russell et al., 2012: 658ff). 
Another example of the CCS project’s close ties to political and legal issues is Vattenfall’s 
expectations on the EU's Emissions Trading System (ETS). Already before the formal 
implementation of the ETS in 2005, Vattenfall expected it to be a crucial market mechanism for 
making CCS cost-efficient and financially attractive as a mitigation option (Annual Report, 2003: 
31; Annual Report, 2004: 31; Strömberg, 2003). The key issue for Vattenfall was to ensure a high 
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enough price on carbon credits. In Vattenfall’s view, this would create an incentive for CCS, since 
the marginal cost of producing electricity with CCS would then be lower than producing electricity 
without CCS, even when accounting for the so-called ’energy penalty’ that CCS incurs (cf. 
Strömberg, 2003; Jordal et al., 2005). This argument is also repeated in Vattenfall’s report Curbing 
Climate Change (2006), in which it proposes a global emissions trading system in order to 
overcome the perceived shortcomings of the ETS. The report also includes a proposal for an 
’adaptive global burden-sharing model’, in which ’developed countries’ would be subject to an 
emissions cap, while ’developing countries’ would be allowed to emit unrestricted amounts of CO2 
until they reach a certain ’GDP threshold’, at which point they too would be subject to emission 
restrictions (Curbing Climate Change, 2006). Vattenfall’s intense lobbying of the political proposals 
it presented in the report (see Hansson, 2008) again underscores the CCS project’s close ties to 
political and social issues, and the many contingencies – technical, social, political and financial – 
that needed to be overcome before CCS could be ’integrated’ into a functioning sociotechnical 
system. Different parts of these issues were also R&D’d in the numerous networks and projects on 
CCS that Vattenfall was participating in – e.g. the EU Framework Programmes ENCAP and CO2 
SINK, and within the EU’s Zero Emissions Platform (ZEP) (see e.g. Daniel & Heiskanen, 2006). 
An important step towards the ’integration’ of CCS as a sociotechnical system came in 2005, 
when Vattenfall decided to build the planned CCS pilot plant (CSR Report, 2005: 23). In May 2006, 
work began on the construction of Vattenfall’s 30 MW oxyfuel CCS pilot plant at the Schwarze 
Pumpe power plant. The pilot plant was designed to ”provide […] knowledge on one potential 
layout of the [oxyfuel] process. However several alternative process solutions are possible. The 
pilot plant has some flexibility in providing opportunities […] to later on test alternative process 
designs and process components” (Strömberg et al., 2009: 589). The materialization of the pilot 
plant represented an emerging ’stabilization’ of Vattenfall’s oxyfuel CCS technology, even though it 
still allowed for the testing of different ’configurations’ of the nascent technology (cf. Russell et al., 
2012: 658).  
The pilot plant was officially inaugurated on September 9, 2008. During the years it was 
operational, tests and measurements were done on e.g. different burner geometry, the combustion 
characteristics of lignite under oxyfuel conditions and on how variations in fuel quality affected the 
oxyfuel process (Strömberg et al., 2009: 588; Annual Report, 2009: 21). The first test results from 
the pilot project were encouraging, with Vattenfall stating that ”The pilot project shows that the 
technology works as intended, and the result has exceeded expectations. The share of carbon 
dioxide that is captured is currently more than 90%” (Annual Report, 2009: 21; see also Strömberg 
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et al., 2009). Given the promising results from the pilot plant, Vattenfall stated that it believed that 
CCS ”will become a reality and that the technology will be commercially viable by 2020” (CSR 
Report, 2009: 13). CCS was now beginning to be seen as indispensable in combatting climate 
change and in reaching the EU’s emission targets (see e.g. CSR Report, 2005) and the 
commercialization of CCS was expected to be imminent (e.g. CSR Report, 2009: 13). 
However, Vattenfall had begun planning as if CCS would inevitably become a reality even 
before the pilot plant was inaugurated. Vattenfall stated that the new hard coal power plant that it 
was planning on building in Moorburg and the planned new 675 MW generation unit at the 
Boxberg power plant, would both be ”ready to be retro-fitted with Carbon Capture Storage 
technology when [CCS is] commercialized” (CSR Report, 2007: 18, my emphasis). In other words, 
the continued expansion of its coal and lignite assets were prospectively legitimized with reference 
to the expectation of CCS’s impending materialization and commercialization. Simultaneously, the 
expectation of CCS’s impending commercialization was used to retrospectively legitimize its past 
acquisitions, i.e. its expansion into the German coal and lignite markets (Hansson, 2008).  
In the midst of all the optimism that surrounded the CCS project, clouds were beginning to 
form on the horizon. In 2009, public protests on CCS broke out in Germany (e.g. Voosen, 2010). 
The protests mainly focused on the storage of CO2 and its associated risks and were sparked as a 
consequence of Vattenfall’s decision to investigate the potential for storage in geological formations 
under the towns of Beeskow and Neutrebbin in eastern Germany. The protests grew and became a 
national issue during Germany’s national elections in the summer of 2009, which prompted 
politicians at the federal level to delay the planned transposition of the EC’s CCS Directive into 
national law (Shogenova et al., 2014; Voosen, 2010). This would soon turn into a considerable 
problem for Vattenfall. 
7.3. Phase 3: 2010–2016. Hype turns into disappointment. 
In 2010, Vattenfall started to imply that it was uncertain whether its investments in CCS would 
continue. Vattenfall stated that ”Provided that research and investments continue, it is estimated that 
CCS can be operating commercially by around […] 2020 at the earliest” (Annual Report, 2010: 37). 
The expectation in 2003 had been that a demonstration plant could be built by 2010, and that a 
commercial plant could be built in the later half of the 2010’s (CSR Report, 2003), and in 2007, 
Vattenfall had stated that its goal was to present ”a commercial concept for CCS at coal-fired 
power-plants by 2020 at the latest” (CSR Report, 2007: 12, my emphasis). Just one year earlier, 
Vattenfall stated that ”we plan to begin demonstrating [CCS] on a large scale by 2015” (CSR 
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Report, 2009: 1). The pushed-back schedule again suggests that CCS was hyped, and that crucial 
contingencies and uncertainties were downplayed in the early ’expectation work’ of Vattenfall. 
Simultaneously, however, the company emphasized that the test program at the Schwarze Pumpe 
pilot plant had been ”successful and given the anticipated results”, and that the ”function and 
processes of oxyfuel technology have been fully verified” (Annual Report, 2010: 62). 
The major (socio)technical issues that Vattenfall was faced with was to ”reduce energy 
consumption in the separation process, which significantly lowers the plant’s efficiency” and to 
”hold down the investment costs for CCS technology” (Annual Report, 2010: 37). To overcome 
these issues, Vattenfall stated that it was ”collaborating with numerous stakeholders to develop the 
necessary social, legal and financial conditions” for CCS. In other words, Vattenfall needed to shape 
the society which would ’receive’ the technology, while continuing the work of shaping the CCS 
technology. More specifically, it had to try and shape that society’s ’legal, social and financial’ 
dimensions in order for CCS to be able to materialize. Without a ’mutual shaping’ of these ’social’ 
and ’political’ dimensions of the technology, it simply would not work. 
The future of Vattenfall’s CCS project now hinged on the materialization of a full-scale 
demonstration plant at the Jänschwalde power plant, which would allow Vattenfall to ”evaluate 
[the] commercial conditions” of its CCS technology (Annual Report, 2010: 37). Vattenfall had by 
this time received a €180 million grant from the European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR) 
as partial funding for the demonstration plant, which carried an estimated price tag of €1.5 billion 
(Annual Report, 2010: 62). However, the conditions for the construction of the demonstration plant 
were seen as uncertain, largely due to the ’legal, social and financial’ issues mentioned above. 
Without a full-scale demonstration plant with which Vattenfall could showcase the feasibility of the 
technology, it would be hard for the company to continue its CCS R&D. And without CCS, the 
company’s investments in coal and lignite power generation would look even more unsustainable 
from an environmental perspective. As Vattenfall itself put it, ”[t]he future of coal depends on CCS” 
(Annual Report, 2010: 20). 
The stakes were thus high for Vattenfall. One of the main concerns for Vattenfall was that 
Germany had not yet transposed the EC’s so-called ’CCS Directive’ into national law (Annual 
Report, 2010: 62). As mentioned above, this delay was prompted by public protest – not least in the 
regions in which CO2 storage projects were being planned (see e.g. Shogenova et al., 2014; Voosen, 
2010). The CCS Directive provides a legal framework for the ’environmentally safe geological 
storage of carbon dioxide’ during the entirety of the storage period and designates closure and post-
closure obligations for the operator, among other things (EC, 2016). The directive had to be 
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transposed into national law by all EU member states by 25 June 2011 at the latest (EC, 2016). 
However, the German government had not done this by 2010, which made the legal status of CO2 
storage uncertain – which, in turn, rendered the future of Vattenfall’s projected €1.5 billion 
investment in the Jänschwalde CCS demonstration plant uncertain. Vattenfall nevertheless held out 
hope that Germany would implement the directive before the EC’s 25 June 2011 deadline. 
However, the Bundestag (German Parliament) took until 7 July 2011 to adopt a new CCS Act 
(Lang, 2011). The proposed CCS Act included a clause which made it possible for Germany’s 
federal states to designate which areas were and were not allowed to use for CCS pilot projects – a 
clause which was heavily criticized by Vattenfall and the state of Brandenburg, who wanted a 
”uniform nationwide law” (Lang, 2011). The bill consequently failed to acquire the necessary 
support in the Bundesrat (Federal Council), which led to a mediation procedure in which the parties 
tried to find a compromise (Lang, 2011; Annual Report, 2011: 18). After two failed attempts at such 
a compromise, Vattenfall announced that it was cancelling its plans for the CCS demonstration plant 
in Jänschwalde on 5 December 2011 (Vattenfall, 2011). It cited the ”ongoing impasse in German 
CCS law” (Vattenfall, 2011) as its reason for the cancellation, and claimed that there was 
”insufficient will in German federal politics to implement the European directive so that a CCS 
demonstration project in Germany could be possible” (Vattenfall, 2011). The hype that Vattenfall 
had built around its CCS project was now decidedly turning into disappointment. 
Despite the cancellation of the demonstration plant and the concurrent ’dramatical decrease’ 
of its CCS R&D budget (Annual Report, 2011: 42), Vattenfall stated that it would continue its R&D 
efforts on CCS. It would especially focus on the R&D of CO2 storage (Annual Report, 2011: 23). It 
stated that ”Hopefully, the long development horizon for CCS and storage tests on an R&D scale 
will facilitate the public dialogue and lead to greater acceptance of storage among the general public 
in time for future investments” (Annual Report, 2011: 42). Presumably, the reason why Vattenfall 
chose to focus on CO2 storage was that this part of the ’CCS chain’ had failed to develop in step 
with the oxyfuel capture technology – especially with regard to social and political issues. The 
belated focus on public dialogue and the fostering of public acceptance which followed (cf. Annual 
Report, 2011; Daniels & Heiskanen, 2006) highlights the fact that Vattenfall failed to predict that 
there would be public skepticism and protest towards CO2 storage. 
 After the reduction of its CCS R&D program, Vattenfall stressed that it would not ”make any 
lifetime-extending investments in existing [coal-fired] plants” or build ”any new coal-fired power 
plants until a political framework is in place for [CCS]” (Annual Report, 2011: 6) after the 
aforementioned Moorburg and Boxberg power plants, which were already under construction, were 
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completed. Vattenfall also underlined that CCS ”must be fully developed and commercially 
viable” (Ibid.) before any lifetime-extending investments would be carried out or any new coal/
lignite-fired power plants would be built. Finally, it emphasized that ”Should the political situation 
change on this issue [CCS], Vattenfall is far advanced in its development, but until then, our CCS 
work is being conducted on a smaller scale” (Annual Report, 2011: 6).  
Vattenfall’s R&D priorities were consequently shifted away from CCS, which had been the 
”largest programme area in the Group” (Annual Report, 2010: 62) just one year earlier. The 
company instead focused its R&D efforts on offshore wind power, ’smart grids’, on ”increasing the 
flexibility of existing heat and hydro power plants” (Annual Report, 2011: 42) and on the co-firing 
of fossil fuels with biomass as means of reducing the company’s ’CO2 exposure’ (Ibid.).  
Vattenfall announced that it had cancelled its CCS R&D program on 6 May 2014 (Vattenfall, 
2014). Instead, the company would focus on ”efficient” R&D that could contribute to Vattenfall’s 
business ”now and in the future” (Ibid.). In October 2014, the company announced that it had 
started to ”look into various alternatives for a new ownership structure for the lignite operations in 
Germany” (Annual and Sustainability Report, 2014: 9) in order to be able to ”transform the 
production portfolio towards lower CO2-emitting sources and more renewables” (Ibid.).  
In 2015, Vattenfall announced that it was initiating a sale of its lignite operations. The bidding 
process started on 22 September 2015 (Annual and Sustainability Report, 2015: 44). Eventually, the 
only bidder that remained in the process was a consortium of two actors – Czech energy company 
EPH and its ’financial partner’ PPF Investments (Vattenfall, 2016b). Despite the vocal critique of 
EPH’s environmental and economical record that erupted in the Swedish media, Vattenfall was 
given a green light to sell its lignite assets to EPH by the Swedish government in July 2016 
(Vattenfall, 2016c). At the time of writing (September 2016), the sale is still in the process of being 
completed. 
8. Concluding discussion 
This paper has shown that Vattenfall produced a wide variety of expectations and visions on CCS. 
During the first phase, these expectations centered around the cost of the technology, the timetable 
for when it could be commercialized and its potential as a mitigation technology. While all of these 
issues involve social and political aspects, the expectations were presented in a more or less purely 
techno-economic, or technologically deterministic fashion (cf. part 7.1.). Vattenfall soon began 
viewing the oxyfuel process as the most promising of the capture technology contenders, and 
focused most of its R&D efforts on this technology. Vattenfall’s high initial expectations arguably 
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helped enroll its academic and industrial partners into the CCS project. They also helped CCS to be 
taken up in a local agenda – i.e. the realization of a ’cost-effective’ means of managing the 
’externalities’ its newly acquired coal- and lignite-fired power plants produced. These findings 
match the results of previous expectation studies well (see e.g. van Lente & Rip, 1998). 
Vattenfall also launched the vision of CCS as a technology which would allow for ’zero 
emissions’, or ’CO2-free’, power plants during the first phase (Andersson et al., 2003; Strömberg, 
2001). This vision was continuously reproduced during the second phase too.  
During the second phase, Vattenfall’s expectations on CCS in general, and the oxyfuel process 
in particular, rose markedly. Vattenfall now expected the oxyfuel process to be considerably cheaper 
than post-combustion and pre-combustion technologies (Strömberg, 2003), and it was seen as ”the 
most promising for early commercialization” (CSR Report, 2009: 12). The oxyfuel process was also 
expected to allow for a ’(near) zero emission power plant’ – not just with regard to CO2, but other 
pollutants too (Strömberg, 2003). In hindsight, it is clear that Vattenfall hyped its CCS project, and 
that this (technologically deterministic) hyping downplayed the many uncertainties and 
contingencies that would have to be overcome in order for CCS to materialize. Nevertheless, the 
materialization of full-scale CCS and the commercialization of the technology was beginning to be 
viewed as imminent during this phase (see part 7.2.).  
The second phase also saw translations of ’promises’ into ’requirements’. The work that 
Vattenfall’s technologists put into meeting these ’requirements’ played a vital role in the 
materialization of the Schwarze Pumpe pilot plant. It could be argued that these ’promise-
requirements conversions’ led to the emergence of a ’prospective structure’ – i.e. a ”not-yet-existing 
structure that is to be filled in with agency” (van Lente & Rip, 1998: 225), which ”is made up of 
links which can be found in texts. In subsequent actions and reactions, the structure is filled in, 
modified, reshuffled – and becomes social structure, in its various forms, i.e. emphatically including 
new technological artifacts” (Ibid.). The pilot plant can be seen as an emerging ’integration’ of 
Vattenfall’s oxyfuel process into a ’fully formed’ sociotechnical system, while simultaneously 
leaving room for trying out different ’configurations’ of the technology. An alternative interpretation 
is that the pilot plant itself was an emerging social structure, which retained some of the 
characteristics of a ’prospective structure’ (cf. van Lente & Rip, 1998). 
During the third phase, Vattenfall’s expectations on CCS began turning into disappointment as 
they were confronted with reality. The expectation on when CCS would be commercialized was 
pushed back to ”2020 at the earliest” (Annual Report, 2010: 37). This was largely explained with 
reference to the uncertainty regarding the feasibility of investing €1.5 billion in the Jänschwalde 
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demonstration plant under the risky and uncertain legal, political and social conditions in Germany 
(see part 7.3.). Vattenfall’s expectations decidedly turned into disappointment when Germany did 
not adopt a uniform, nation-wide legal framework on CO2 storage within an acceptable timeframe 
for Vattenfall. This led Vattenfall to cancel its planned investment in the Jänschwalde demonstration 
plant. It nevertheless carried on with its CCS R&D, but on a much more modest scale. This pattern 
aligns almost perfectly with the so-called ’hype-disappointment cycle’ (see e.g. Porter & Randalls, 
2014). Vattenfall cancelled its CCS R&D project in May 2014 and decided to sell its lignite assets 
in Germany in the fall of 2015. In my opinion, it is reasonable to assume that the failure of the CCS 
project made Vattenfall’s coal and lignite operations (even more) unviable, since CCS was 
Vattenfall’s only way of legitimizing its coal/lignite operations from an environmental perspective. 
CCS was also a way of ’ensuring’ (to some extent) the future cost-efficiency of coal and lignite 
power production in Energiewende-Germany. 
The analysis has also pointed toward the ’narratives’, or ’stories’ (Law, 2015; Selin, 2008) that 
Vattenfall employed in its ’expectation work’ on CCS. A recurring narrative in the material is the 
scripting of CCS as a kind of technological ’savior’ for the climate change issue. In this narrative, 
the consequences of not developing and deploying CCS are (implicitly) encoded as dystopic. For 
instance, Vattenfall stated that ”The risks of CCS are very small in comparison to the risks of not 
going for CCS” (CSR Report, 2007: 13). Furthermore, Vattenfall stated that ”If we do not take 
control of our emissions, we will be forced to make drastic changes to the conditions under which 
we – and more so our children and grandchildren – live” (Annual Report, 2004: 3). In this 
moralized narrative (cf. Berkhout, 2006), CCS implicitly becomes a means of assuring that ’we’ and 
’our children and grandchildren’ do not have to suffer drastically changed life-conditions. 
Another recurring narrative is that of CCS as an ’inevitability’ if we are to reach ambitious 
climate stabilization targets (see also Hansson, 2008; 2012). For instance, Vattenfall stated that the 
EU’s goal of reducing Europe’s CO2 emissions by 60-80 percent by 2050 ”can hardy be reached 
without the carbon capture and storage technology” (CSR Report, 2005: 28). At the same time, 
however, Vattenfall repeatedly emphasize that ”CCS is not a substitute for renewable energy 
sources” (CSR Report, 2009: 13), but one technology among a range of necessary mitigation 
technologies. 
As we have seen, expectations played an important role in the ’rise’ of the CCS project. I will 
here argue that expectations were equally important in the ’fall’ of the project. As the analysis 
indicated, the CCS project did not necessarily fail because the oxyfuel technology itself failed. In 
fact, it seems to have performed above expectations at the Schwarze Pumpe pilot plant (Annual 
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Report, 2009: 21; Strömberg et al., 2009). Instead, much of Vattenfall’s problems stemmed from its 
focus on technical expectations and techno-economic considerations and its lack of focus on 
overcoming the (embedded) social and political issues of the project. This allowed the complex 
sociopolitical reality in Germany to ’punch holes’ in Vattenfall’s expectations and visions of CCS 
(cf. Russell et al., 2012) – e.g. through the public protests against CO2 storage that erupted and the 
consequent legal impasse around the transposition of the CCS Directive (see Shogenova et al., 
2014; Voosen, 2010). This issue is also manifested by the general lack of social expectations and 
visions in the material for this paper. It seems that Vattenfall’s failure largely consisted in it not 
being able to ’integrate’ the social and political dimensions of CCS into a ’fully formed’ 
sociotechnical system. Perhaps Vattenfall didn’t spend enough time producing forceful ’expectation 
bids’ (Berkhout, 2006) and visions of the society which would ’receive’ the technology in order to 
convince the German public of CCS’s perceived virtues? 
Furthermore, Vattenfall suffered from a ’failure of imagination’ with regard to its inability to 
predict the emergence of widespread public skepticism and protest towards CO2 storage. As 
mentioned in part 7.3., this led to a belated focus on public dialogue and a lack of public 
participation measures at early stages of the project (cf. Daniels & Heiskanen, 2006). Ironically, 
Vattenfall could learn a thing or two from itself in this context, e.g. by reviewing its involvement in 
the preemptive public participation efforts on nuclear waste management in Sweden – even though 
these measures were problematic in many other respects (see e.g. Elam & Sundqvist, 2006). 
Finally, I will discuss how Vattenfall’s CCS project can be understood as a ’political device’. 
Firstly, it is obvious that the development of CCS lay in Vattenfall’s sociopolitical interest as a state-
owned company which has ’corporate social responsibility’ embedded into its governing 
documents, which nevertheless decided to invest in German coal and lignite. As this paper has 
shown, Vattenfall quickly identified CCS as a promising opportunity after these acquisitions. This 
was likely because CCS represented a potential solution to Vattenfall’s lignite conundrum, since it 
could function as a way of reducing its CO2 emissions and of deflecting the criticism that was 
aimed against it for its dubious environmental behaviour. Hansson (2008: 247) has in this context 
argued that CCS was seen as a ’saving angel’ by Vattenfall’s Board of Directors. 
Thus, CCS was a ’political device’ in that it acted as a means of legitimizing Vattenfall's coal 
and lignite assets (cf. Hansson, 2008: 247). Vattenfall used its expectation on the ’ever-imminent’ 
materialization of CCS as resource to retrospectively legitimize its initial coal/lignite acquisitions, 
and to prospectively legitimize the expansion of its coal/lignite assets. However, as soon as reality 
’punched holes’ in this expectation (cf. Russell et al., 2012), Vattenfall had to retract its earlier 
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’promise’ that Moorburg and Boxberg would be ’capture ready’, and instead promise that Moorburg 
and Boxberg would be the last power plants/generation units the company would build that would 
not be equipped with CCS (Annual Report, 2011: 6). 
Lastly, CCS can function as a ’political device’ in that it is a way of keeping coal and lignite 
on the political agenda in the current context of increasingly ambitious climate targets. CCS can 
function as a means for incumbent energy companies to ’cling on’ to their market positions in this 
context, since CCS is a ’regime-led’ innovation, rather than a radical, disruptive innovation that has 
been developed in ’niches’ (see e.g. Winskel, 2012). CCS can therefore be viewed as a tool for 
incumbent energy companies to safeguard the industry’s ’status quo’, simultaneously as it allows 
them to ’colonize the future’ (cf. Hansson, 2012).  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